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Consumer Panelist Behavior in Experimental Auctions:
What Do We Learn From Their Bids?
Abstract
Experimental economics procedures such as laboratory experimental auctions are
increasingly being used to measure consumers’ willingness-to-pay.  A sealed-bid, fourth-price
Vickrey-style auction was used to measure consumers’ willingness-to-pay for flavor in beef
steaks.  Two hundred and forty-eight consumers from Chicago and San Francisco participated in
the experimental auctions.  The data gathered from these experimental auctions was then used to
examine individual demand or utility in an experimental, uniform-price auction; and to analyze
market demand and market price in an experimental auction when supply is fixed but demand
varies.  The results indicated that certain demographic variables may increase the probability that
a participant wins or loses an experimental auction.  The market price was found to be a function
of the number of participants in a panel, as well as consumers’ tastes and preferences.  Changes
in the market price of the auctions in the study appear to be more a function of the same factors
that influence demand in the marketplace, rather than a wealth effect.  Consumers in this
research did appear to be expressing their true value for the auction product and the auction
provided a valuable measure of consumers’ WTP for flavor.
Keywords:  Experimental auctions, Vickrey auctions, willingness-to-pay, beef demand 
Introduction
In recent years, agricultural economists have become more involved in marketing
research.  This phenomenon is likely due to the continual evolution away from commodity
marketing and toward individual product marketing.  One area where agricultural economists’
skills have been valued is consumer acceptance and willingness-to-pay (WTP) for new products
and different product attributes. 
Previous WTP studies conducted by economists used contingent valuation methods to
form hypothetical scenarios to measure WTP.  A central question regarding contingent valuation
is whether values elicited from hypothetical surveys reflect consumers’ true WTP.  Due to the
concern over the “hypothetical nature” of the contingent valuation approach, research conducted
more recently has used experimental economic procedures such as laboratory experimental
auctions to elicit WTP for new products and product attributes.  A number of different auction
techniques exist, but the majority of the research has used a variation of the second-price, sealed-
bid auction; frequently referred to as a Vickrey auction (Menkhaus et al., 1992; Buhr et al.,
1993; Hayes et al., 1995; Melton et al., 1996; Roosen et al., 1998).  1 Shogren et al. (1994) designed a random nth-price auction to reduce the strategic bidding
potential within repeated auctions.  They found no significant difference in mean bids from
second-price auctions and random nth-price auctions.
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The Vickrey auction, and similar, uniform nth-price auctions, are assumed to be demand-
revealing because they provide an incentive for auction bidders to reveal their true preferences. 
According to Vickrey’s (1961) theory, there is no gain from strategic bidding because the market
price is independent of one’s bid.  Auction participants who bid less than their true value reduce
their chances of winning the auctioned good at a potentially profitable price; and on the other
hand, by submitting a bid more than their true value, auction participants have a greater
probability of winning, but paying a price that is in excess of their true value (Shogren et al.,
1994).
The demand-revealing theory of the Vickrey auction is based on the assumed behavior of
auction participants.  This theory may fail when applied to a simulated “real-world” laboratory
setting where consumers use real money and actually experience the product in question. 
Previous research has suggested that “. . . a one trial second-price auction for an unfamiliar asset
or risk might not accurately reflect the bidders’ disciplined valuation (Shogren et al., 1994).” 
For example, Coppinger, Smith and Titus (1980) found that bid prices in second-price auctions
took a considerable time to converge to their theoretically predicted value.  Therefore, several
trial auctions are necessary for the bidder to experience the unique auction concept and to form
their values (Coursey and Smith, 1984; Menkhaus et. al., 1992; Hoffman et al., 1993; Shogren et
al., 1994; Fox, et al., 1995; Hayes et al., 1995; Kagel, 1995)
Although the second-price auction with repeated trials gives bidders an opportunity to
learn the auction price and to update their preferences and bids based on previous market prices,
it also allows bidders to gain information about the upper end of the value distribution for a
product (Shogren et al, 1994).
1  This information may create a strategic bidding environment, and the Vickrey
auction may no longer be truly a demand-revealing auction.
Shogren, List and Hayes (2000) recently tested the hypothesis that preference learning
about an unfamiliar good, rather than the novelty of the laboratory experimental experience,
influences auction bids.  They compared the bids for three goods of varying familiarity:  candy
bars, mangos and irradiated meat, over four consecutive experimental auctions.  Their results
suggested that preference learning was the primary source of the high price premia paid for new
food products in experimental laboratory valuations.  They also found that bidding behavior
differed across sessions, but only for the unfamiliar good; thus, the novel laboratory
experimental experience did not entice subjects to bid differently for familiar goods.  
Most of the previous literature has either examined the theory of the auction or
empirically tested the theory using subjects such as university students.  Few studies have
examined how the auction dynamics worked in an experimental auction designed to measure
WTP using consumers that are representative of the market population.
How valid are the WTP results elicited from experimental auctions if consumer behavior
within the experimental auction is influenced by their demographics or their knowledge of the4
product in the experiment?  How do the values elicited through the experimental auction
compare to values observed in the retail market place?  Is there a rational explanation or
justification if the values differ significantly?  Does economic theory hold up in experimental
auction markets?   Furthermore, how do repeated auctions impact consumers’ bids?
Objectives
The overall objective of this paper is to extend the knowledge and understanding of
experimental auctions by evaluating the dynamics of repeated, uniform-price (fourth-price)
auctions and the bidding behavior of the panelists.  This research has two specific objectives: 1)
to examine individual demand or utility in an experimental, uniform-price auction, i.e., what
influences bidding behavior; and 2) to analyze market demand, or more specifically, market
price in an experimental auction when supply is fixed but demand varies.
Experimental Procedures
Twenty-four consumer taste panels were conducted in Chicago, IL and San Francisco,
CA to determine consumer willingness-to-pay for beef flavor.  Consumers were recruited over
the phone by independent product development firms in each of the respective cities. 
Individuals who met the research requirements were invited to participate in a taste panel where
they would have the opportunity to taste New York Strip Steaks.  Consumers were told that they
would receive $25 in Chicago and $35 in San Francisco for their participation, and that they
would have the option to purchase steaks similar in quality to those they sampled in the taste
panels.  Twelve taste panels consisting of 12 consumers each were scheduled in both locations.  
Upon arriving at the research facility, panelists were first paid the money they were
promised over the phone, and were asked to complete two surveys, the first survey contained
questions about the participants’ demographic characteristics and meat purchasing behavior, and
the second survey assessed participants’ beef knowledge.  Panelists then visually evaluated a
pair of steaks in a simulated supermarket setting.  Next, the unique fourth-price auction was
explained, and three practice, non-binding auctions were completed to familiarize the
participants with the auction process.  
After the practice auctions were completed, the taste panel procedure and auction process
was explained.  Panelists were encouraged to bid their true value for each of the steaks and
reminded that if they “won” a binding auction, they were obligated to purchase the one-pound
package of steaks at the auction market price (fourth-highest bid).  The individual experimental
auctions consisted of four steps: 1) panelists completed a “blind” taste test and evaluation of a
pair of steak samples, 2) panelists submitted two bids in dollars per pound for each sample in the
pair, 3) all bid sheets were collected by the auction monitors, and 4) the auction monitor
announced the market price (fourth-highest price) for each steak sample in the pair.
The four-step process was completed a total of three times: twice for a marbling
comparison: USDA Choice steaks versus USDA Select steaks; and once for a country-of-origin
comparison: USDA Select steaks versus Argentine steaks.  Thus, each panelist had the2 The difference between multi-unit, single-demand auctions, and multi-unit demand auctions is
important, as the latter of the two has been shown to be allocatively inefficient.  List and
Lucking-Reiley (2000) and Alsemgeest, Noussair and Olson (1998) discuss and compare multi-
unit demand auctions to single-unit demand auctions.  
3 For an in depth explanation of the independent private values model see Kagel (1995). 
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opportunity to bid on, and to purchase three pairs of steak samples; or in other words, panelists
submitted a total of six bids and could have won or have purchased a total of six steak packages. 
Because the auction was a fourth-price auction, three one-pound packages of frozen steaks were
sold for each of the six steak samples.  Panelists were only allowed to purchase one package of
steaks in each auction, so while the auction was a multi-unit auction, it was a single-unit demand
auction rather than a multi-unit demand auction.
2  
To prevent explicit collusion, which the theoretical Vickrey auction model assumed not
to exist, communication was not allowed between participants during the auction procedures. 
All participants knew how many items were for sale in each period (three) and were also aware
of their competition.  Furthermore, the participants knew their own valuation for the product and
were also informed of the market price for each auction from the previous period, but they were
not given the actual values of their competitors.  Thus, the independent private values
information structure assumed in the Vickrey auction was present.
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Methodology
Tests of Consumer Theory in Experimental Auction Markets
The experimental design of this research was unique compared to previous applied
experimental economic studies which measured consumers’ WTP for food products.  Several
characteristics of the auction design allowed examination of the factors influencing both
individual demand and market prices in experimental, sealed-bid Vickrey auctions.  Consumer
WTP was measured on an already established, familiar market good, beef steaks, that possessed
two different quality attributes.  Because consumers did not need to learn their preferences for a
new product (Shogren, List and Hayes, 2000) the factors influencing consumers’ demand for a
familiar market good in a theoretically demand-revealing auction could be tested.  Specifically,
consumer behavior within the experimental auction could be explored, and the influence of
participant demographics and their knowledge of the experimental product, on individual
demand could be examined.  
Rather than randomly selecting a binding auction (as suggested by Shogren et. al., 1994),
all of the successive auctions were binding, purchase auctions.  Hence, economic theory would
suggest that as subsequent auctions were run, the market price may decrease as some buyers
(panelists) become satiated and either place a lower value on the next good sold or choose to
drop-out of the bidding process.  This phenomenon is referred to as the “wealth effect” in
auction literature (Friedman and Sunder, 1994; Shogren et al., 1994).  If the wealth effect existed
because of the binding nature of our successive auctions, then the market price in our successive
binding auctions could be downward biased and the validity of the WTP value would be
questionable.  6
Panel size varied from six to 12 participants in the experiment.  This allowed us to
examine a change in market demand and the resulting auction market price when the experiment
is conducted with a varying number of consumer participants.  How responsive is the auction
market price to the size of the experimental panel?  Two different payment levels and locations
were used in the experiment, which also may have affected the market price.
Consumer Behavior in Experimental Auction Markets
Not all taste panelists in the experiment chose to actively participate in the auction. 
Panelists were told they could submit a bid of zero if they did not want to participate.  However,
if they submitted a bid of zero, they were asked to give an explanation of why they were bidding
zero.  This qualitative information is summarized in the results sections.
Most of the panelists did submit bids; however, some panelists never won an auction
because they never submitted a bid above the market price.  While other panelists won all six
binding auctions.  This experiment was primarily designed to determine consumers’ taste
preferences and to elicit consumers’ WTP for their preferences.  Yet, from the bids it was
obvious that some panelists were winning auctions on products they did not prefer, while others
did not win an auction on a product that they preferred.  Are there demographic factors that
would explain auction winners and losers?
 The functional equation shown in Equation 1 was developed to examine the impact of
consumer demographics and consumption habits on the probability that a consumer would either
be a winner or a non-winner in the experimental auction markets.  
winneri = f(meat eater, beef eater, price, age, education, household,                     (1)
      employ, income, ethnic, gender, location, knowledge).
Panelists were categorized as winners if they submitted a bid greater than the market
price in at least one of the six binding auctions, and were nonwinners otherwise. If the
participant was a winner, then the dependent variable in Equation 1, winner, was equal to one.  If
the participant was a non-winner, then the dependent variable was equal to zero, (i = 1 – 248). 
The independent variables used in the model were chosen based on previous studies
examining consumer beef demand and assumed socioeconomic variables that would likely affect
an individual consumer’s demand for beef (Capps, 1989; Menkhaus et al., 1992).  Meat eater
was a categorical variable representing the number of times per week meat was eaten in the
home.  Beef eater was a discrete variable equal to one if beef was the meat product consumed
most often in the household, and was equal to zero otherwise.  Price was also a discrete variable
equal to one if a participant indicated that price was the most important driver of their shopping
decisions, and price was equal to zero otherwise.  Age, education, household, employ, and
income were all categorical variables used to represent the effect of a participant’s age,
education, household size, employment status and annual income on the probability they would
win or lose an auction.  Ethnic was a participant’s ethnic background, and was equal to one if the
participant was Caucasian, and was equal to two otherwise.  Gender was the gender of the4 When the model was estimated, the Argentine market prices were eliminated from the data set
because of extremely low taste panel rating and extreme variations in market prices.  
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participant.  Location was equal to one for Chicago and two for San Francisco.  Knowledge was
the panelist’s score on the beef knowledge quiz (10 = perfect score).  Each of the categorical
variables is further described in Table 1.  
Equation 1 was estimated using a logit regression procedure.  The logit model is based on
the random utility model and is explained in depth in Green (1997, pp. 871-901).  Panelists




panelist’s utility of winning an auction, and purchasing a steak; and U
n was the panelist’s utility
of not winning an auction and not purchasing a steak.  Direct observation of the participant’s
utility from winning or losing an auction was not possible, however, participants who submitted




Market Price and Market Demand in Experimental Auction Markets
If an experimental, sealed-bid Vickrey auction is truly demand-revealing, the principles
of consumer demand should also hold true in the auction setting.  Changes in population,
income, and tastes and preferences of the auction participants should shift the experimental
market demand and market price as theory suggests.  The various panel sizes and the panelists’
taste panel rankings allowed examination of the factors affecting market price in the
experimental auction.  The three sequential auction time periods permitted checking to see if the
“wealth effect” existed and biased the market price.  The following regression equation was used
to test the hypothesis that changes in market price from one auction to the next could be
explained by changes in panel population, panelists’ tastes and preferences, demographic and
procedural differences between research locations, and a “wealth effect” associated with the
repeated binding auctions:
market pricein = b0 + b1pansize + b2 tprate + b3 tprate stdev + b4dpdummy +b5 time  (2) 
              + b6 choice + e.                            
Where market price is the market price for the i
th auction and the n
th taste panel, where i
takes the value of one to six for the six auctions in each taste panel, and n takes on the value of
one to 24 for each of the 24 taste panels.  Pansize is equal to the number of participants in an
auction; tprate was the average taste panel rating based on consumers’ overall acceptability
ratings (1 = extremely undesirable, 8 = extremely desirable) for the sample; tprate stdev is the
standard deviation of the taste panel rating, and is used to account for perceived variation in
steak quality, Dpdummy is a dummy variable used to account for any differences attributable to
demographics (Chicago versus San Francisco consumers) and research procedures (such as the
$25 endowment in Chicago versus the $35 endowment in San Francisco) between research
locations and is equal to 0 if the location was Chicago and is equal to 1 if the location was San
Francisco; Time takes on a value of 1 for the first Choice versus Select steak comparison and
auctions, a value of 2 for the second Choice versus Select steak comparison and auctions, and a
value of 3 for the domestic steak versus Argentine steak comparison and auction, respectively.
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The time variable was included as a test of the hypothesis that successive bidding order did not
influence the market prices.  Choice is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the steak sample was a
USDA Choice steak (high marbled) and is equal to 0 if the steak was a USDA Select steak (low
marbled).    
It was hypothesized that the beta coefficients associated with Pansize, tprate, tprate
stdev, dpdummy and choice dummy variables would be significant and positive.  Based on
demand theory, as population and consumers’ tastes and preferences increased, demand should
have also increased, shifting demand outward.  While no a priori knowledge existed on likely
differences in demand between the Chicago and San Francisco markets, it was hypothesized that
the higher income endowment given to the San Francisco consumers would have increased their
demand ceteris paribus.  
Results
Two hundred and forty-eight consumers participated in the taste panels, 124 in both
Chicago and San Francisco.  The participants were primarily Caucasian females, were between
the ages of 35 and 54 and had an annual household income of  $40,000 to $69,000.  The
participants also consumed a large amount of meat in their diet, 58% of the respondents
indicated that they prepared and ate meat 3-6 times per week.  Beef (63%) and chicken (27%)
were the meat products that the participants preferred to consume.
The Factors Influencing Individual Demand in Experimental Auction Markets
The first objective of this research was to determine the factors influencing participant
behavior and individual demand in an experimental auction market.  To address this objective, a
frequency analysis was first completed to examine the number of winners and nonwinners in the
data set.  A panelist was defined as a winner if they submitted a bid above the market price in at
least one of the six binding auctions and a nonwinner otherwise.  Approximately 65% of the
participants won at least one auction, 19.9% of the participants won at least four auctions, and
seven individuals (only 3.1%) won all six auctions.  Of those individuals winning an auction,
45.6% won at least one sample that was not their preferred sample in the pair.  
These statistics indicate that some consumers may have consistently bid a slightly higher
or lower value (strategically bid) to increase the probability that they either won or lost an
auction.  Were there any demographic characteristics that increased the probability of an auction
participant winning or losing an auction?  Did some participants who indicated that they ate beef
several times per week place a higher value on the steak than consumers who ate primarily
poultry or pork?  Did participants in a lower income category participate only for the monetary
payoffs and try to avoid winning an auction?  An answer of “yes” to any of these questions may
indicate that some participants’ auction behavior was inconsistent with the demand-revealing
property of the Vickrey auction (i.e. some participants did not bid their true value) and the
validity of the auction is questioned.  9
Table 2 provides a somewhat qualitative analysis of the consumers who chose to exit the
market altogether and submitted zero bids on all products (22 participants).  The quotes from
individuals who consistently bid zero in all six of the experimental auctions were placed in five
categories: unknown source, storage, not interested in purchasing meat, needed money, and did
not like the product.  The comments ranged from “not interested in purchasing steak today” to
“college student, [and I am] broke”.  Some of these reasons may be representative of the same
group of people who choose not to purchase beef in the supermarket on certain days, influencing
the “real world” market price for beef.  This raises the question of whether or not these
individuals bias the auction market and what can future researchers do to prevent these
individuals from participating in research trials?  Or should anything be done to prevent these
participants from participating because they actually represent true market behavior?
Equation 1 was estimated with the logit procedures of SAS to examine the effect of
demographic variables on the probability that an auction participant would be an auction winner. 
The results of the logit model are shown in Table 3.  The coefficients on the beef eater, price,
education and ethnic variables were all significant (" = .05).  Participants who consumed beef
most often in their household were less likely to win an auction.  Consumers with a higher
education, consumers who were price-driven and non-Caucasian consumers were more likely to
win an auction.  The knowledge variable was not significant.  The negative sign of the beef eater
coefficient is opposite of the expected sign; this may indicate that the participants in this study
who indicated that they did not typically purchase beef do so because of price, not because they
prefer another meat.  While some variables were significant, the overall model was not a good
predictor of auction winners, thus, researchers may not need to be as concerned as previously
thought about selecting auction participants.
The Factors Influencing Market Demand and Price in Experimental Auction Markets
The second objective of this research was to determine the factors influencing market
price and market demand in an experimental auction market.  The overall average market price
for all auctions and the average market price for each of the panel sizes are shown in Table 4. 
No significant difference existed between market prices; however, the number of observations
for each panel size was relatively small.  In order to examine the factors influencing market
demand in the auctions, Equation 2 was estimated using the ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression procedures of SAS.  Due to correlated independent variables, two OLS regressions
were run: one without the choice dummy variable and one without the tprate variable.  The
results of the estimation are shown in Table 5.  The independent variables explained 57% - 68%
of the variation in market price (adjusted R
2 = .57 and .68).  The variation in market price in the
experimental auctions was explained by the same factors that influence market price or shift
market demand in the “real world”.  
In the first regression, the pansize, tprate, and dpdummy coefficients were all significant,
and as hypothesized, the signs on all of three coefficients were positive.  As panel size increased,
market demand increased and the market price also increased.  The average market prices were
plotted in Figure 1.  Graphically, the average market price appeared to increase for all treatments
as the panel size increased from 6 to 11 panelists.  The average market price then decreased
slightly from panels of size 11 to size 12. 10
The significance and positive sign of the tprate coefficient indicated that market prices
increased with higher taste panel ratings (increasing tastes and preferences increased market
price).  The significant and positive sign on the dpdummy dummy variable was not surprising;
cultural differences between Chicago and San Francisco may have influenced consumers’ WTP. 
Procedural differences between locations may have also caused these differences; for example,
the San Francisco consumers were given a larger income endowment, which may have increased
the market price in San Francisco (an increase in market income should shift the demand curve
out and increase market price).  The insignificance of the time variable indicated that consumers
in our study did not reach a significant level of satiation, thus, no “wealth effect” was apparent
from these results.  
In the second OLS regression model, the pansize and dpdummy variables were significant
and positive, similar to the first OLS regression.  The tprate stdev and choice dummy variables
were also significant.  If the steak was higher marbled, USDA Choice beef, then market price
increased by $.22/lb.; thus, based on taste, consumers were willing-to-pay a significant premium
for the higher marbled beef.  The negative coefficient on the tprate stdev variable indicates that
an increase in the perceived variability or quality of the steak (by one unit) will decrease the
market price by $.37/lb.  
Summary
These results indicate that certain demographic variables may increase the probability
that a participant wins or loses an experimental auction.  In particular, in this research,
consumers who were “price-driven” shoppers may have realized that they were getting a “good
deal” and may have bid high enough to win an auction and to purchase the steaks.  
The market price was found to be a function of the number of participants in a panel, as
well as consumers’ tastes and preferences.  Thus, changes in the market price of the auctions in
the study appear to be more a function of the same factors that affect demand in the marketplace,
rather than the “wealth effect.”  This is not to say that if auction participants had been given the
opportunity to complete one or more rounds of bidding, that satiation would not have occurred. 
However, the wealth effect did not appear to bias the bids in this research.  Consumers in our
research did appear to be expressing their true value for the auction product and the auction
provided a valuable measure of consumers’ WTP for flavor. 11
Implications
Our research indicates that Adam Smith’s theory of the invisible hand is at work in an
experimental market as it is in the real world market place.  Individual participants pursuing their
own self-interest, results in an equilibrium market price.  However, our research also shows that
the experimental auction market price is influenced by panel size and consumers’ tastes and
preferences for the auctioned good.  If researchers are interested in the experimental auction
price being similar to the real world market price for a product, then pre-trial experiments will
need to be conducted to determine the correct panel size and payment.  Further research is also
necessary to identify the appropriate panel size to use when auctioning multiple products. 
Research examining the effect of income endowment on market price would also be interesting.  
The use of experimental auctions to determine consumer acceptance and WTP for
product attributes or new products is increasing.  Each research project requires specific
alterations to fit the experimental procedures to the research settings.  The information gained
from our research should aid future researchers in selecting consumers for their experiment, in
eliciting more accurate consumer WTP through experimental auction markets and in interpreting
their results.12
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Figure 1.  Average Auction Market Prices by Treatment and Panel Size.15
Table 1.   Description of the Categorical Variables Used in Winner Equation.
Variable Definition Possible Values
Winner Consumer won or lost an auction. 1 = consumer won at least one auction
0 = otherwise
Meat eater Number of times per week meat
was eaten in the home
1 = 1-2 times, 2 = 3-4 times, 3 = 5-6 times
4 = 7-8 times, 5 = 9-10, 6 = more than 10
Beef eater Meat product consumed most
often
1 = beef was the meat product consumed
most often
0 = otherwise
Price Driver of shopping decisions 1 = price, 0 = otherwise
Age Consumer’s age category 1 = under 25 years, 2 = 25-34 years, 
3 = 35-44 years, 4 = 45-54 years,
5 = 55-64 years, 6 = over 64 years
Education Level of education 1 = completed at least a college degree, 
0 =otherwise
Household Number of family members living
at home
1 = 4 or more family members
0 = otherwise
Employ Category of employment level 1 = employed either full or part-time
0 = otherwise
Income Income category 1 = 10,000-19,999, 2 = 20,000-29,999
3 = 30,000-39,999, 4 = 40,000-49,999
5 = 50,000-59,999, 6 = 60,000-69,999
7 = 70,000-79,999, 8 = 80,000-89,999
9 = 90,000-99,999, 
10 = greater than 100,000
Ethnic Ethnic background Category 1= Caucasian, 0 =otherwise
Gender Gender category 1 = female, 0 = male
Loc Location of taste panel research 1 = Chicago, 2 = San Francisco
Knowledge Panelist’s knowledge quiz score 10 = perfect score, 0 = no correct answers16
Table 2.  Comments from Panelists Bidding Zero in All Auctions.
Category Comment
Unknown Source · Not interested in purchasing, I like to see exactly the
piece of meat I'm buying.
· I don't buy meat from unknown sources. I don't know
if meat stayed frozen.
· I only purchase from known sources.
Storage
· In between housing. No freezer.
· Freezer is full.
· Moving.
· I've already done my shopping for this week, and I
have no room for any meat right now.
Not Interested in Purchasing
Meat
· Just purchased meat.
· Don't want to win any steaks.
· I am not bidding because I feel that it was not made
clear when I was asked to participate that there was
to be an auction and I don’t want to buy meat now (If
I were to purchase this meat I would be willing to
spend $4.99/lb).
· Was good, but don't want to purchase at this time.
· Do not want to purchase meat at this time.
· Just not interested.
Need Money · I choose to keep the money.
· Broke.
· Not bad, but it's the end of the month and I'm broke.
· College Student – no money.
· Not prepared to spend $ today.
Did Not Like  · Don't care for enough to purchase.
· Did not like enough to purchase
· Either bad cook or all meat was bad
· Did not care for product.17
Table 3.  Results from the Experimental Auction Winners Logit Model. 
Variable Coefficient Chi-Square
















a Variable is significant at the " = .05 level
n = 440, Pseudo R
2 = .134418
Table 4.  Average Market Prices ($/lb) for Varying Panel Sizes (Standard Deviation is in
parenthesis).
                  Average Market Price for Treatment                       
     Pair One           Pair Two           Pair Three     
Panel Size
a # Obs. Choice Select Choice Select Domestic Argentine





















































































a Panel size is equal to the number of participants (consumers) in each panel.
b Number of observations is equal to the number of panels in a panel size category.
c Overall mean is the average of all market prices for a treatment (n=24 per treatment).19
Table 5.  Market Price OLS Regression Results.
Taste Ranking Model Choice Model
Variable Coefficient t -value Coefficient t -value
intercept -3.2979
a -6.14 -0.7377 -1.86
pansize 0.2812




tprate stdev -0.1168 -0.86 -0.3703
 a -2.48
dpdummy 0.2055
 a 1.94 0.3974
 a 3.38





2 0.68          0.57
a Variable is significant at the " = .05 level
b Variable is significant at the " = .10 level
n = 120,  Adjusted R
2 = .68